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Abstract 
This paper will firstly examine the international framework of human rights law and its 
guidelines for safeguarding the right to freedom of speech in the press. Secondly, it will 
describe the constitutional and other legal rights protecting freedom of speech in 
Indonesia and assess their compatibility with the right to freedom of speech under the 
international human rights law framework. Thirdly it will consider the impact of 
Indonesia’s constitutional law and criminal and civil law, including sedition and 
defamation laws, and finally media ownership, on the interpretation and scope of the 
right to freedom of speech in the press. Consideration of these laws will be integrated 
with a discussion of judicial processes. This discussion will be used to determine how 
and in what circumstances the constitutional right to freedom of speech in the press may 
be facilitated or enabled, or on the other hand, limited, overridden or curtailed in 
Indonesia. Conclusions will then be drawn regarding the strengths and weaknesses of 
Indonesian laws in safeguarding the right to freedom of speech in the press and the 
democratic implications from an international human rights perspective. This inquiry 
will be restricted to Indonesian laws in existence during the post-New Order period of 
1998 to the present, and to the information and analysis provided by English-language 
sources. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech is recognised 
as an international human right by the 
United Nations (‘the UN’) who ‘play a 
vital role in promoting and protecting 
human rights worldwide.’1 In 1948 the 
UN General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                                            
1  Sangsuvan, Kitsuron, ‘Balancing 
Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under 
International Law’ (2014) 39 North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 701, 707-8. 
(‘the Declaration’) setting out 
‘fundamental human rights to be 
universally protected’ and aiming for ‘a 
common standard of achievements for 
all peoples and all nations.’2 The right 
to freedom of expression is included as 
one of the thirty articles outlining 
universal rights contained in the 
                                                            
2  The United Nations, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
<http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights/>. 
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Declaration. 3  Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 (‘the ICCPR’) 
is based on the wording and sentiment 
of Article 19 of the Declaration 4  and 
forms part of the International Bill of 
Human Rights which aims to guarantee 
civil and political rights. 5  In seeking 
that the articulated rights be ‘accepted 
by people of all nations and cultures’6 
the UN encourage the homogenisation 
of law across the globe. On account of 
such aims Article 19 of the ICCPR is 
presumed for the purpose of this essay 
to articulate the ideal global standard of 
the right to freedom of speech. It 
provides that ‘[e]veryone shall have the 
right to hold opinion without 
interference’ and that ‘[e]veryone shall 
have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and import information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice.’ 7  In 
accordance with the wording of Article 
                                                            
3 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’), GA Res 217A (III) UN 
GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 
(10 December1948) art 1. 
4 UDHR, UN Doc A/810, art 19. 
5 Sangsuvan, above n 2, 710. 
6 Ibid 709. 
7 UDHR, UN Doc A/810, art 19 
19 the right to freedom of speech 
thereby extends to the press and media 
platforms online. 
Whilst not intended to be 
‘binding on states as part of positive 
international law,’ 8  the Declaration is 
according to American academic 
Kitsuron Sangsuvan accepted as 
providing a ‘foundation of international 
human rights law.’ 9  Furthermore, as 
academic Dr Nadirsyah Hosen asserts, 
the endorsement of the Declaration by 
virtually all states has enabled it to 
acquire ‘customary international law’ 
status.10 In order however for the  right 
to freedom of speech to be legally 
recongised within one’s own state, the 
domestic legal system of that state must 
legally acknowledge and protect that 
right.11 Sangsuvan thereby observes that 
‘the domestic legal system provides the 
principal legal protection of freedom of 
speech.’ 12  The right to freedom of 
speech in the press is not strictly 
guaranteed by international law, but 
rather, dependent on the law of 
domestic legal systems and the 
                                                            
8 Sangsuvon, above n 2, 709. 
9 Ibid 710. 
10 Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Human rights and 
press freedom’ in Nadirsyah Hosen, Human 
Rights, Politics and Corruption in Indonesia: a 
critical reflection on the post Soeharto Era 
(Dordrecht 2010) 141, 143. 
11 Sangsuvon, above n 2, 709 
12 Ibid. 
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adherence of that system to the 
principles of international human rights 
law.  
Creating a degree of uniformity 
to laws regulating press freedom across 
legal systems in accordance with UN 
standards or guidelines could arguably 
contribute to the democratisation of the 
press in Indonesia. Indonesia’s 
transition to democracy since the fall of 
the Suharto government in 1998 has 
been discussed extensively in 
international legal commentary. 13  In 
examining press freedom in Indonesia, 
American academic Dr Robert 
McChesney has noted ‘a crucial aspect 
of viable journalism in a democracy is 
its ability to give rigorous account of 
who is in power and who wishes to be 
in power.’14 This is how, according to 
Indian academic Naveen Mishra, news 
media ensures adequate checks and 
balances are kept on national 
government and the head of state, 
                                                            
13 See, eg, Ross Tapsell, ‘Politics and 
Press in Indonesia’ (2012) 39(2) Media Asia 
109; Naveen K. Mishra, ‘Governmental Threats 
for Media Freedom: comparative study of Asian 
countries’ (2008) 69(1) The Indian Journal of 
Political Science 149; Nadirsyah Hosen, Human 
Rights, Politics and Corruption in Indonesia: a 
critical reflection on the post Soeharto Era 
(Dordrecht 2010); Royan, Naomita, ‘Increasing 
Press Freedom in Indonesia: the Abolition of 
the Lese Majeste and ‘Hate-Sowing Provisions’ 
(2008) 10 Australian Journal of Asian Law 291.  
14 Quoted in Tapsell, above n 1, 109. 
thereby fulfilling its role as the ‘Fourth 
estate’ of democracy.15  
This paper seeks to analyse 
Freedom of speech in Indonesia from 
the perspectives of human rights. 
Constitutional and other legal rights 
protecting freedom of speech in 
Indonesia will be analysed under the 
international human rights law 
framework. It will also consider the 
impact of Indonesia’s constitutional law 
and criminal and civil law, including 
sedition and defamation laws, and 
finally media ownership, on the 
interpretation and scope of the right to 
freedom of speech in the press. 
Consideration of these laws will be 
integrated with a discussion of judicial 
processes.  
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses juridical-
normative method, including reviewing 
and analysing the rules of freedom of 
speech in Indonesia. Relevant laws and 
policy is analysed. 
The approach used in this paper 
is statute approach. Constitutional 
protection on freedom of speech will be 
                                                            
15  Naveen K. Mishra, ‘Governmental 
Threats for Media Freedom: comparative study 
of Asian countries’ (2008) 69(1) The Indian 
Journal of Political Science 149, 149. 
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analysed from human rights point of 
view. It begins with the brief 
description on international legal 
framework on freedom of speech and 
human rights. Furthermore, Indonesian 
constitution and freedom of speech law 
will be analysed in the framework of 
international human rights laws. 
 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
TO THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN INDONESIAN PRESS 
Hosen recognises that the right 
to express an opinion is honoured in the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia (‘the Constitution’) 
encapsulated in Article 28.16  However 
Article 28 of the Constitution does not 
outline or identify the extent to which 
the right is protected by law. Rather the 
provision states that the ‘[f]reedom to 
unite and gather, express opinions orally 
and in writing and the others shall be 
stipulated by virtue of law’17 (emphasis 
added). The qualifications to the right to 
freedom of speech under the ICCPR are 
explicitly listed under Article 19(3) and 
‘shall only be such as are provided by 
law and are necessary: (a) For respect of 
                                                            
16 Hosen, above n 11, 148. 
17  The 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia art 19. 
the rights or reputations of others; (b) 
For the protection of national security or 
of public order or of public health or 
morals.’ 18  Although a member of the 
United Nations since 28 September 
195019 Indonesia was relatively late in 
its accession to the ICCPR. The ICCPR 
entered into force on 23 March 1976 
with Indonesia assenting nearly thirty 
years later on 23 February 2006.20 The 
Indonesian government therefore had 
prior to its ratification of the ICCPR, 
and still maintains by virtue of its 
domestic law, wide scope to legislate to 
restrict the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression under Article 28 
for matters beyond those listed in 
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. This has 
arguably created weaknesses in 
safeguarding the constitutional right of 
Indonesian journalists to express free 
speech, for example by restricting that 
                                                            
18 The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) GA res 2200A, 
UN GOAR, 21st sess, Supp No (16) 52, UN Doc 
A/6316 (1966) art 19.  
19 The United Nations, United Nations 
Member States 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.
htm>. 
20  The United Nations Treaty 
Collection, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en>; Law No 12 of 2005 of 
the Republic of Indonesia on the Confirmation 
(Pengesahan) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
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right through sedition laws, as 
illustrated by case examples discussed 
below. 
The second amendment to the 
Constitution in 2000 expanded and 
clarified the right to freedom of speech 
with the addition of chapter XA on 
Human Rights. Amendments included 
the addition of Article 28(3) which 
entitles everyone to unite, gather and 
express opinions, and Article 28F which 
states ‘[e]veryone shall be entitled to 
communicate and obtain information to 
develop their personality and social 
setting, and to find, obtain, have, keep, 
process and give information with any 
means of channel available.’ 21  This 
phrasing resembles Article 19 of the 
ICCPR in its recognition that the right 
to freedom of speech exists on ‘any 
means of channel’ and thereby includes 
expressions of free speech online. 
Constitutional amendment thereby 
helped define, clarify and expand the 
right to freedom of expression, 
strengthening the legal protection of 
free speech in the press.  
 
CIVIL LAW PROTECTION OF 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN INDONESIAN PRESS 
                                                            
21  The 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia art 28F. 
Law No 9/1998 of the Republic 
of Indonesia on Freedom of Expression, 
introduced in the post-New Order 
period, recognises freedom of speech as 
both a right and a responsibility that 
must be exercised in a ‘responsible 
way.’22 The right to freedom of speech 
for journalists specifically is further 
safeguarded by the Law No. 40/1999 of 
the Republic of Indonesia on the Press 
(‘the Press Law’). The philosophical 
basis of the Press Law describes press 
freedom as ‘the utmost important 
element in creating a democratic 
society, nation and state to assure the 
freedom of expressing ideas and 
opinion as stated in Article 28 of the 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 must 
be guaranteed.’ 23  This philosophical 
basis is reinforced by the following 
provisions: 
a. Article 2 which states ‘the 
freedom of the press is one of 
the embodiments of sovereignty 
of the people based upon 
principles of democracy, justice 
and supremacy of the law’;  
b. Article 3 which outlines the 
social control function of the 
                                                            
22 Law No 9/1998 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Freedom of Expression; in Hosen, 
above n 11, 162. 
23 Law No 40/1999 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on the Press. 
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press, enabling it to criticise 
government policies and provide 
public debate on political issues, 
thereby ‘[opening] the door for 
the press to act as the fourth 
estate’ of democracy;24 
c. Article 4 which states press 
freedom is guaranteed as a basic 
right for citizens and should be 
‘free from censorship and is not 
subject to publication and 
broadcasting bans’;25 and 
d. Article 6 which states that the 
role of the press is to ‘enforce 
basic democratic principles, 
promote the embodiment of the 
supremacy of the law and 
human rights, while at the same 
time respecting diversity.’26 
 
The aim of using the Press Law 
to facilitate freedom of speech and 
contribute to the creation of a 
democratic society mirrors decisions 
made in the European Court of Human 
Rights, which have interpreted the right 
to freedom of speech as ‘one of the 
basic conditions for [the] progress of a 
democratic society and for the 
                                                            
24 Hosen, above n 11, 201. 
25 Ibid 200-1. 
26  The 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia arts 2-4, 6. 
development of every man.’ 27 
Contributions were made to the drafting 
of the Press Law Bill by international 
organisations, including legal experts 
from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(‘UNESCO’) and from Article XIX, a 
British NGO whose activities focus on 
safeguarding the right to freedom of 
expression. 28  The Press Law is 
supported by Law No. 39/1999 of the 
Republic of Indonesia on Human Rights 
(‘Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights’), 
that acknowledges the ‘responsibilities 
and obligation of the Government in the 
promotion and protection of human 
rights.’ 29  Specifically in relation to 
freedom of speech, Article 19 of Law 
No. 39/1999 on Human Rights ‘protects 
the right to seek, own, store and 
disseminate information, through any 
channel.’30 Law No. 39/1999 on Human 
Rights also serves to prop up Articles 
19-21 of the 1998 MPR Human Rights 
Charter which ‘protects citizens’ rights 
to freedom of expression without 
interference, and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas, through 
                                                            
27 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 
24 ECHR (ser. A) 23. 
28 Hosen, above n 11, 198.  
29 Ibid 162. 
30 Law No 39/1999 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Human Rights art 14.  
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any media.’31 The constitutional right to 
freedom of speech in Indonesia is 
thereby supported through numerous 
civil law provisions. The rights to 
freedom of speech conferred by the 
Constitution and under Indonesia’s civil 
laws are in theory compatible with the 
international right to freedom of speech 
as articulated by the UN.  
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND 
ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW 
FUNCTION  
The establishment of the 
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court which 
commenced operation along with its 
judicial review function in 2003, by 
virtue of  the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution in 2002 and the addition of 
Article 24C, strengthens the legal 
protection of the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech.32 The Constitutional 
Court provides a legal avenue through 
which members of the press and other 
individuals can assert their 
constitutional right to freedom of 
                                                            
31  Stipulation made by the National 
Assembly of the Consultative Council of the 
Republic of Indonesia No. XVII/MPR/1998 on 
Human Rights; Hosen, above n 11, 159. 
32  Naomita Royan, ‘Increasing Press 
Freedom in Indonesia: the Abolition of the Lese 
Majeste and ‘Hate-Sowing Provisions’ (2008) 
10 Australian Journal of Asian Law 291, 297. 
speech when legislation is perceived to 
hinder or obstruct that right. The 
Constitution did not in its original form 
create a Constitutional Court and until 
2002 ‘Indonesian courts did not have 
jurisdiction to exercise judicial 
review.’ 33  The new standing given to 
parties whose constitutional rights are 
adversely affected by civil or criminal 
laws,34 to challenge the constitutionality 
of those laws, is therefore a significant 
improvement and strength in 
safeguarding the right to freedom of 
speech in Indonesian press. 
 
THE IMPACT OF SEDITION 
LAWS ON THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
INDONESIAN PRESS 
In 2006 and 2007 the judicial 
review function of the Constitutional 
Court was used to hear two significant 
cases, Constitutional Court Decision No 
012- 022/PUU-IV/2006 (‘Sudjana and 
Lubis’) and  Constitutional Court 
Decision No 6/PUU-V/2007 (‘Panji’), 
that challenged sedition laws which 
operated to restrict freedom of speech in 
order to enhance the President’s ‘ability 
to govern peacefully.’ 35  Sedition laws 
                                                            
33 Ibid 296-7. 
34 Ibid 297.  
35 Ibid 293. 
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are in this regard distinct from 
defamation laws which proscribe 
expressions that cause harm to an 
individual’s reputation. 36  Instead 
sedition laws proscribe ‘words or 
conduct deemed to incite discontent or 
rebellion against the authority of the 
state.’ 37  Whilst the ICCPR recognises 
the qualification to freedom of speech 
for the purpose of maintaining public 
order in accordance with Article 19(3), 
it is argued by Australian legal 
practitioner Naomita Royan that the 
sedition laws are ‘questionable, at the 
very least, in countries founded on 
democratic principles.’38  Royan argues 
that ‘[i]n such nations, a ruler is the 
people’s representative and, as such, 
does not possess a “divine right” but is 
held accountable to the electorate, the 
members of which are entitled to 
criticise and question their elected 
representatives.’ 39  Sedition laws are 
also in antithesis to the democratic 
purpose of the Press Laws, which as 
previously discussed, recognise that ‘the 
utmost important element in creating a 
democratic society, nation and state [is] 
to assure the freedom of expressing 
                                                            
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
ideas and opinions’ by guaranteeing or 
safeguarding the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech in the press.40  
The existence of sedition laws 
undeniably weakens the ability to assert 
one’s right to freedom of speech in the 
press. In Sudjana and Lubis a political 
activist and a lawyer both charged with 
sedition argued that the Indonesia 
Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang 
Hukum Pidana) (‘Criminal Code’) 
Articles 134, 136 and 137, which 
criminalised insults made against the 
President and Vice-President, were 
unconstitutional. 41  While Article 134 
had broad application in applying to 
anyone who deliberately insulted the 
President or Vice-President, Article 137 
as noted by Royan ‘directly targeted 
journalists and the press’ by 
criminalising dissemination with the 
intention of publicising those insults.42  
Under these provisions those who 
reported and published any criticisms 
others made of the President or Vice-
President in the press could be 
prosecuted, and if found guilty, face up 
to six years imprisonment.  
Furthermore, Criminal Code Article 
                                                            
40 Law No 40/1999 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on the Press. 
41 Royan, above n 33, 298.  
42 Ibid 294-5. 
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137(2) prohibited ‘repeat offenders who 
disseminated those views in the course 
of their occupations . . . “from 
exercising the aforesaid profession.”’43 
Journalists and editors therefore risked 
exclusion from the profession if found 
guilty of more than one sedition charge, 
significantly curbing their ability to 
exert the right to free speech on political 
matters involving the heads of state.  
Sudjana and Lubis is a landmark 
decision enabling press freedom in 
Indonesia, following the Constitutional 
Court’s finding that the Criminal Code 
provisions were ‘remnants of Indonesia 
colonial past’ under Dutch rule, 
originally intended to snare ‘prominent 
figures of the independence movement’ 
in Indonesia and therefore 
‘contradictory to the position of 
Indonesia as an independent and 
sovereign state.’ 44  The specific 
constitutional provisions that the 
Constitutional Court majority ruled had 
been offended by the Criminal Code 
were Article 27(1) concerning equality 
before the law, Article 28F concerning 
the ability to communicate and obtain 
information, and Article 28E(2)-(3) 
concerning the freedom to express 
                                                            
43 Ibid 295. 
44  Constitutional Court Decision No 
012- 022/PUU-IV/2006 at [3.18.6]. 
opinions and attitudes. 45  The court 
found that the criminalisation of insults 
against the President and Vice-President 
under Criminal Code Articles 134, 136 
and 137 were unconstitutional and 
‘contrary to Indonesia’s democracy.’46 
Interestingly, Article 28 of the 
Constitution was not argued or held to 
be infringed, providing support for the 
argument that Article 28 as a stand 
alone provision provides weak or 
limited protection for freedom of speech 
in the press, as posited earlier in this 
paper. The decision in Sudjana and 
Lubis confirms the significance of the 
Constitutional amendments made in 
2000, with the additional constitutional 
Articles 28F and 28E(2)-(3) being used 
by Sudjana and Lubis to assert and 
enforce their rights to freedom of 
speech in the press. The Court’s 
decision in Sudjana and Lubis also 
highlights the strength of judicial 
review in safeguarding the right to 
freedom of speech in the press.    
In the 2007 case of Panji the 
constitutionality of sedition provisions 
contained in Articles 154 and 155 of the 
Criminal Code, which criminalised 
‘public expression of feelings of 
hostility, hatred, or contempt toward the 
                                                            
45 Royan, above n 33, 291. 
46 Ibid 290. 
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government,’ were challenged. 47 
Similarly to Article 134, Article 154 of 
the Criminal Code applied to anyone 
who publicly expressed feelings of 
hostility, hatred or contempt towards the 
Indonesian government. Meanwhile 
Article 155(1) criminalised 
dissemination with the intention of 
publicizing those views, thus explicitly 
targeting members of the press.48 It was 
therefore submitted by applicant Panji 
that Articles 154 and 155 had the 
‘potential to repress freedom of the 
press, because these provisions were 
available to silence those who criticised 
the Indonesian government, as well as 
those who reported criticism of it.’ 49 
Furthermore, as noted by Royan, 
Articles 134 and 154 both lacked a 
mens rea element. 50  Journalists could 
thereby be found liable without having 
‘actual or intended consequences to the 
[use of the] insult or expression of 
hostility.’51 
Additionally there was not 
legislative definition outlining what 
constituted an ‘insult,’ and in a legal 
system that does not apply the 
principles of stare decises no uniform 
                                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid 294. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
definition could be formulated and 
applied by the courts in latter cases.52 
As further argued by Royan, ‘[t]he lack 
of definitions in the law enabled it to 
undermine the very operation of the 
media, as journalists would necessarily 
be reluctant to criticise the leaders of 
the country without knowing when that 
criticism was seditious.’ 53  In addition, 
there was reluctance by the press to 
report popular criticism of the state’s 
actions 54  or the views of ‘political 
activists and other politicians.’55  
Panji proved to be a landmark 
decision signaling a move towards a 
more democratic press with the 
Constitutional Court ruling that Articles 
154 and 155 of the Criminal Code did in 
fact infringe the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression under Article 28 
as well as freedom of expression under 
Article 28E(2)-(3).56 As a result of the 
decisions in Panji and Sudjana and 
Lubis Criminal Code Articles 134, 136, 
137, 154  and 155 no longer have the 
                                                            
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 295. 
54  Human Rights Watch, Turning 
Critics into Criminals: the human rights 
consequences of criminal defamation in 
Indonesia (3 May 2010) < 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/03/turning-
critics-criminals/human-rights-consequences-
criminal-defamation-law>. 
55 Royan, above n 33, 295. 
56 Ibid 291. 
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force of law.57 Royan concludes that the 
judicial defeat of these provisions 
‘[discourages] media self-censorship, 
[and] demonstrate[s] that the country is 
shifting away from its repressive 
colonial and post-independence, 
authoritarian legacy towards a more 
open, rights-based democracy, with 
growing space for the media.’58  
 
THE IMPACT OF DEFAMATION 
LAWS ON THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
INDONESIAN PRESS 
In practice however numerous 
Criminal Code provisions continue to 
limit the right to freedom of speech in 
the press. This is despite the significant 
developments towards a more 
democratic press signaled by the 
enactment and commencement of the 
Press Law in 1999. Under the Press 
Law Article 15 granted the Indonesian 
Press Council independence from the 
government in order to develop freedom 
of the press and expand the existence of 
the national press.59 It also conferred on 
the Council the power to adjudicate all 
media disputes by ‘providing 
                                                            
57 Ibid 290-1. 
58 Ibid 292. 
59 Law No 40/1999 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Freedom of the Press art 15(1). 
consideration and finding settlement to 
public grievances on cases related to 
press coverage or news.’ 60  This 
function was reinforced by a Supreme 
Court ruling in 2005.61 However, recent 
cases examined by Freedom House 
suggest that instead of bringing 
defamation charges under the Press 
Law, authorities now ‘undermine the 
council’s mandate’ 62  by bringing 
defamation charges to the courts under 
other laws which can result in the 
imposition of harsh criminal penalties 
and extensive periods of imprisonment. 
Whilst the ICCPR recognises respect 
for the right to reputation as a 
qualification on expression of free 
speech in accordance with Article 19, 
an overwhelming number of defamation 
offences continue to exist in Indonesia’s 
criminal code. Such provisions 
numbered more than 40 in 2015, and are 
sufficiently vague in their definition to 
pose difficulties for journalists in 
knowing when a criticism will 
constitute a defamatory expression.63  
                                                            
60 Ibid art15(2)(d). 
61  Freedom House, Freedom of the 
Press: Indonesia (2012) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2012/indonesia>. 
62  Freedom House, Freedom of the 
Press: Indonesia (2015) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2015/indonesia>. 
63 Ibid.  
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As explained by Royan, 
defamation laws concerning reputation 
are distinct from sedition laws discussed 
above. 64  However, in justifying their 
decision in the case of Eggi and 
Pandapotan, the Constitutional Court 
noted that defamation provisions in 
Articles 310–321 of the Criminal Code 
can still be used in situations where the 
President or Vice-President’s personal 
reputation is damaged, while Article 
207 which ‘criminalises insults to rulers 
and public bodies, [can] be used in 
situations where the President or Vice-
President is insulted in his or her 
official capacity.’ 65  There is therefore 
some over lap between the sedition laws 
now repealed and defamation provisions 
still in existence. The obvious utility in 
limiting the number of existing criminal 
provisions dealing with the same or 
similar criminal acts could, as indicated 
by the Court’s reasoning, have 
contributed to the Court’s decision to 
annul the sedition provisions. As the 
constitutionality of defamation Articles 
207, 310, 311 and 316 of the Criminal 
Code was upheld in 2008 Decision No 
14/PUU-VI/200866 the practical impact 
                                                            
64 Royan, above n 33, 293. 
65  Constitutional Court Decision No 
012- 022/PUU-IV/2006 at 60 in Royan, above n 
34, 299 
66 Royan, above n 33, 304.  
of the repeal of sedition Articles 134, 
136, 137, 154  and 155 is limited. 
Members of the press can still have 
their right to freedom of speech denied 
and face criminal prosecution for 
insulting or criticising rulers and public 
bodies, including the President or Vice-
President, or acts that occur in their 
official capacity as the heads of state.67  
The Human Rights Watch 
reasonably asserts that ‘[d]efamation 
laws exist to protect individuals from 
having their reputations intentionally 
and falsely tarnished by others.’68 Laws 
proscribing defamatory speech 
theoretically fall within the ‘necessary 
and narrowly drawn’69 qualifications to 
free speech recommended by the 
ICCPR under Article 19.70 It is common 
in many countries for civil defamation 
laws to enable victims of defamatory 
speech to receive monetary 
compensation or an apology, however 
Indonesia imposes additional criminal 
                                                            
67  Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-
undang Hukum Pidana) art 207. 
68  Human Rights Watch, Turning 
Critics into Criminals: the human rights 
consequences of criminal defamation in 
Indonesia (3 May 2010) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/03/turnin
g-critics-criminals/human-rights-consequences-
criminal-defamation-law>. 
69 Ibid. 
70 The ICCPR, UN Doc A/6316, art 19. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
53 
 
penalties for ‘reputational harm.’ 71  As 
Indonesia’s defamation provisions are 
complaint-driven, the complainant can 
elect at their discretion whether to 
pursue a civil or criminal claim, or both, 
against the alleged wrongdoer. 72  In 
effect criminal and civil provisions 
proscribe the same offence, the only 
difference being the penalty imposed, 
which for criminal offences is up to six 
years imprisonment in the case of 
defamatory speech shared over the 
internet,73 as opposed to the remedies of 
compensatory payment or measures to 
publicly retract the defamatory speech 
which apply in civil cases.74  
As the discretion lies in the 
hands of the complainant to choose 
which avenue to prosecute insulting 
speech, the protection of freedom of 
speech in the press is weakened. 
Deliberate ‘insulting’ speech, even if 
the statements made are true, against 
public officials acting in an official 
capacity carries a penalty of up to 18 
                                                            
71 Turning Critics into Criminals: the 
human rights consequences of criminal 
defamation in Indonesia, above n 69. 
72 Royan, above n 33, 304. 
73 Law No 11/2008 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Electronic information and 
transaction. 
74 Turning Critics into Criminals: the 
human rights consequences of criminal 
defamation in Indonesia, above n 69. 
months imprisonment. 75  As noted by 
the Human Right Watch, this has led to 
a tendency for politicians to elect to lay 
criminal defamation charges against 
journalists who are critical of their 
conduct or views.76  
The Alliance of Independent 
Journalists (‘AJI’) has also voiced 
concerns about the increasing use of 
Law No 11/2008 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Electronic Information 
and Transaction (‘ITE Law’) ‘to muzzle 
internet users with spurious defamation 
claims. According to Indonesia 
Corruption Watch, as of October 2014, 
71 people had faced defamation charges 
under Article 27 (3) of the ITE Law 
since it was passed, with 40 cases in 
2014.’ 77  As discussed, penalties for 
defamatory statements posted or shared 
online carries a penalty of up to six 
years imprisonment. 78  The impact of 
these defamation laws may be self-
censorship by members of the press, if 
they remain fearful of the risk of 
imprisonment or loss of employment to 
report on pertinent political issues, or 
                                                            
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Freedom of the Press: Indonesia, 
above n 63. 
78 Ibid. 
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news involving political figures 
including the heads of state.79   
In a recent article the Human 
Rights Watch has argued that ‘criminal 
penalties are always disproportionate 
punishments for reputational harm and 
should be abolished.’80 This position is 
supported by the fact that civil 
defamation and criminal incitement 
laws already exist, and may be regarded 
as ‘sufficient for the purpose of 
protecting people’s reputations and 
maintaining public order’ whilst at the 
same time ‘written and implemented in 
ways that provide appropriate 
protections for freedom of 
expression.’81 
Further supporting the argument 
for the abolishment of criminal 
defamation provisions is the disjunction 
between the prison terms that apply for 
defamation under the Criminal Code in 
comparison with the criminal penalties 
that apply for hindering a journalist’s 
right to free speech under the Press 
Law. Violation of Article 18 of the 
Press Law, which applies to ‘anyone 
who intentionally impedes the national 
press in exercising that press freedom, 
                                                            
79 Turning Critics into Criminals: the 
human rights consequences of criminal 
defamation in Indonesia, above n 69. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.  
as provided in article 4’ by imposing 
‘censorship, banning or restriction of 
broadcasting,’ will result in a two year 
imprisonment or up to 500 million 
rupiah fine.82 In comparison, the penalty 
for defamation under Article 310 of the 
Criminal Code is four years 
imprisonment, this is double the penalty 
imposed for hindering the right of the 
press to express free speech. 83  The 
imposition of harsher penalties for 
defamatory speech in comparison to the 
unlawful censorship of free speech 
indicates that the law prioritises control 
of press content, over the facilitation of 
the right to freedom of speech in the 
press. The Human Rights Watch points 
out that ‘the application of criminal 
defamation laws in Indonesia gives rise 
to a damaging, chilling effect on speech 
central to the effective functioning of a 
democratic society. It can seriously 
undermine the work of local NGOs and 
community-level actors working to 
combat corruption’ 84  and thereby 
weakens the protection of the right to 
free speech in the press. 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND 
REGULATION  
                                                            
82 Hosen, above n 11, 205. 
83 Ibid 209. 
84 Turning Critics into Criminals: the 
human rights consequences of criminal 
defamation in Indonesia, above n 69. 
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In an article published in 2010, 
Hosen commented that ‘[a]lthough [the 
Press Law] introduced a new paradigm, 
“professional freedom of the press”, it is 
apparent that full implementation of 
these rules and principles is a still a long 
way off.’ 85  This paradigm is 
encapsulated in Article (c) of the 
Statement of the Philosophical Base for 
the Press Law 1999 which reads: ‘the 
national press as the media for mass 
communication, information 
dissemination, and shaping public’s 
opinion, must be able to perform at its 
best according to its principles, 
functions, rights, obligations and roles 
based upon the professional freedom of 
the press, guaranteed and protected by 
the law and free from any interference 
and intrusion.’ 
The Press Law states that these 
values are in accordance with Article 5 
item (1), Article 20 item (1), Article 27, 
and Article 28 of the Constitution and 
the Indonesia’s Human Rights policy.86 
One of the weaknesses however in the 
realisation of this paradigm is the lack 
of legal regulation over media 
                                                            
85 Hosen, above n 11, 209. 
86 Law No 40/1999 of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Freedom of the Press; Stipulation 
made by the National Assembly of the 
Consultative Council of the Republic of 
Indonesia No. XVII/MPR/1998. 
ownership which effects 
professionalism and quality of the press.  
According to Australian 
academic Dr Ross Tapsell, control of 
the flow of news since the fall of the 
Suharto regime in 1998 ‘has shifted 
from the government and military to an 
oligarchic group of media owners with 
political and business interests.’ 87 
Nonprofit groups Hivos Southeast Asia 
and the Center for Innovation, Policy 
and Governance conducted a study in 
2011 that found ‘nearly all of the 12 
most prominent media companies had 
ties to political parties in some respect. 
These 12 companies also own the 
country’s 10 major national television 
stations and five of the six major 
newspapers.’ 88  This has led to what 
Tapsell describes as self-censorship as a 
professional practice in Indonesian 
journalism.89 Freedom House confirms 
that media coverage of the 2014 
Presidential election was indicative of 
‘the ability of political parties, large 
corporations, and powerful individuals 
to control media content, with major 
media outlets openly reflecting the 
                                                            
87 Tapsell, Ross, ‘Old Tricks in a New 
Era: Self-Censorship in Indonesian Journalism’ 
(2012) 36 Asian Studies Review 227, 228. 
88  Freedom of the Press: Indonesia , 
above n 63. 
89 Tapsell, above n 88, 288. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
56 
 
political affiliations of their owners.’90 
Journalists interviewed at the Surabaya 
Post, bought by 2014 Presidential 
candidate for the Golkar party Aburizal 
Bakrie in 2008 and managed by 
executives of his subsidiary company 
Lapindo, explained how their autonomy 
had been limited since this change in 
ownership, due to ‘pressure or fears of 
being reprimanded or fired’ if they 
reported news critical of the 2014 
Presidential candidate or companies 
owned by him.91 Tapsell recognises the 
pressure put on journalists to censor 
news coverage as the ‘antithesis to 
journalism as crucial to a functioning 
democracy which Indonesia has 
embarked upon since 1999.’92  
One legal solution to the covert 
pressure placed on journalists which 
undermines the aims of the Press Law 
would be to reform what Tapsell 
describes as the ‘weak laws which do 
not regulate the system of ownership.’93 
Whilst print media is regulated through 
the press council and broadcast media 
licensed by the Ministry of 
Communication and Information 
Technology and the Indonesian 
                                                            
90  Freedom of the Press: Indonesia , 
above n 63. 
91 Tapsell, above n 1, 110, 113-4. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 100. 
Broadcasting Commission, 94  there are 
no limits on the control and ownership 
of the press and distribution channels by 
political parties or politicians. By 
contrast, Taiwan amended its media 
laws in 2003 resulting in the ban of 
political parties and politicians from 
involvement or investment in private 
radio and TV stations. 95  A similar 
reform in Indonesia, requiring political 
parties and members of parliament to 
sell out their stockholdings and 
relinquish their control of media 
channels, would arguably provide 
greater safeguards for freedom of 
speech and facilitate the 
democratisation of the press, as it did in 
Taiwan.96  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
The Indonesian press has indeed 
evolved since its ‘de-politicised’ state 
under Suharto’s New Order regime. 97 
Legal reform in Indonesia in the post-
New Order period has in theory 
strengthened the protection of the right 
to freedom of speech in the press. The 
                                                            
94  Freedom of the Press: Indonesia , 
above n 63. 
95  Chen-Ling Hung, ‘Media Control 
and Democratic Transition: Ongoing Threat to 
Press Freedom in Taiwan’, (2013) 9(2) China 
Media Research 83, 87. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Hosen, above n 11, 155. 
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2000 Constitutional amendments that 
expanded the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech, the creation of the 
Constitutional Court with its judicial 
review function, and the Constitutional 
Court decisions of Eggi and 
Pandapotan and Panji that found 
certain sedition provisions to be 
unconstitutional, mark what Royan 
describes as ‘Indonesia’s continuing 
evolution towards the 
institutionalisation of far greater 
freedom of expression’ in the press.98  
However, in spite of Indonesia’s 
progress towards a free press, President 
Joko Widodo made a speech to the 
legislature on 14 August 2015 
lamenting the ‘[c]urrent tendencies that 
people feel they are ultimately free to 
behave and voice their opinions as they 
like. This is less productive when the 
media only pursues ratings instead of 
guiding the public to be virtuous and 
have a productive work culture.’99 This 
sentiment echoes the justifications used 
to censor the press in the period of 
Suharto’s New Order rule, when the 
media was perceived as the 
                                                            
98 Royan, above n 33, 296. 
99 ‘Jokowi told not to mess with press 
freedom’, The Jakarta Post (online), 15 August 
2015  
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/
15/jokowi-told-not-mess-with-press-
freedom.html#sthash.DblP2YaE.dpuf>. 
‘government’s partner’ in the process of 
nation building, and the right to 
freedom of speech in the press 
significantly curtailed. 100  It was 
reported in August 2015 that the 
Widodo government submitted a draft 
Criminal Code amendment to the House 
of Representatives that would make 
insulting the president a crime, 101 
despite the annulment of that same 
provision by the Constitutional Court in 
Sudjana and Lubis in 2006.102  
The democratisation process of 
the Indonesian press is not yet 
complete. Further changes can 
undoubtedly be made to strengthen the 
ability to manifest one’s right to 
freedom of speech through the press, 
such as the introduction of media laws 
regulating and restricting ownership of 
media channels by politicians, and the 
eradication of criminal defamation 
provisions. Indonesia’s continuing 
progress towards a democratic press 
will rest largely on the legislature’s 
decision to curb or pragmatically 
facilitate the rights of journalists to 
express free speech. 
 
                                                            
100 Hosen, above n 11, 153. 
101 ‘Jokowi told not to mess with press 
freedom’, above n 100. 
102  Constitutional Court Decision No 
012- 022/PUU-IV/2006. 
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